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Abstract
Background: The medical "brain drain" has been described as rich countries "looting" doctors and
nurses from developing countries undermining their health systems and public health. However this
"brain-drain" might also be seen as a success in the training and "export" of health professionals and
the benefits this provides. This paper illustrates the arguments and possible policy options by
focusing on the situation in one of the poorest countries in the world, Malawi.
Discussion: Many see this "brain drain" of medical staff as wrong with developed countries
exploiting poorer ones. The effects are considerable with Malawi facing high vacancy rates in its
public health system, and with migration threatening to outstrip training despite efforts to improve
pay and conditions. This shortage of staff has made it more challenging for Malawi to deliver on its
Essential Health Package and to absorb new international health funding.
Yet, without any policy effort Malawi has been able to demonstrate its global competitiveness in
the training ("production") of skilled health professionals. Remittances from migration are a large
and growing source of foreign exchange for poor countries and tend to go directly to households.
Whilst the data for Malawi is limited, studies from other poor countries demonstrate the power
of remittances in significantly reducing poverty.
Malawi can benefit from the export of health professionals provided there is a resolution of the
situation whereby the state pays for training and the benefits are gained by the individual
professional working abroad. Solutions include migrating staff paying back training costs, or rich
host governments remitting part of a tax (e.g. income or national insurance) to the Malawi
government. These schemes would allow Malawi to scale up training of health professionals for
local needs and to work abroad.
Summary: There is concern about the negative impacts of the medical "brain-drain". However a
closer look at the evidence for and against the medical "brain-drain" in Malawi suggests that there
are potential gains in managing medical migration to produce outcomes that are beneficial to
individuals, households and the country. Finally we present several policy options.
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With a GDP per capita of just USD 167 in 2004, Malawi
remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Eco-
nomic growth rates during the last 10–15 years have con-
sistently fallen below that required to make an impact on
poverty, and on most socio-economic indicators Malawi
compares unfavourably with her regional neighbours.
Malawi's exports are dominated by commodities (like
tobacco) where the terms of trade are turning against the
country. A number of efforts have been made by the Gov-
ernment of Malawi to move into new export sectors how-
ever the poor economic climate (high interest rates and
inflation), the poor state of utilities and very high trans-
port costs have hampered them.
Yet, in recent years Malawi has achieved notable success in
the export of services – the export of skilled medical per-
sonnel – without any policy effort. Trade in services is
increasingly being given more attention as a potential
source of foreign exchange for land-locked countries such
as Malawi that are struggling to compete in the world trad-
ing system and appear to have no comparative advantage
in any product sector. But this "brain drain" has been
described as rich countries "looting" doctors and nurses
from developing countries [1]. The Malawi press has also
described how the "nurses brain drain" is resulting in sig-
nificantly reduced quality of care in public hospitals in the
country [2,3]. The costs of the "brain-drain" are perceived
as being much greater than the gains and include loss of
public educational investment, intellectual capital, fewer
and poorer health services, and understaffing of services
[4-7].
Some recent research, however, has suggested that health
sector migration might be a "win-win" for both develop-
ing and developed countries, if properly managed [8]. The
purpose of this paper is to explore the costs and benefits
of this migration to Malawi, and to determine what policy
measures are required.
Discussion
The scale of the brain drain in Malawi and mitigation 
attempts
Many commentators in both the developed and develop-
ing world see this "brain drain" of essential medical staff
from poor and HIV/AIDS afflicted countries such as
Malawi as something which is fundamentally wrong. At
first glance these arguments are compelling and draw
upon the idea that developed countries are exploiting the
developing world by taking the few trained medical staff
away from essential work.
In a recent and full analysis, the Ministry of Health in
Malawi has described the human resource situation as
"critical" [9]. As can be seen in Table 1, the level of vacan-
cies across the entire public health system is acute with an
overall vacancy rate of 33 percent. However, this figure
masks the severe shortage of nurses where 64 percent of
established posts are unfilled. For surgeons and various
types of doctor, the vacancy ratio reaches close to 100 per-
cent. Of Malawi's 156 public sector doctors, 81 are work-
ing in central hospitals meaning that some districts do not
have any doctor at all. Clinical Officer posts are much bet-
ter filled (73%).
The MoH document continues to state that the average
number of nurses in health centres is approximately 1.9,
an indication that many are run with one or none at all
and indeed, some health centres are now manned as
health posts by Health Surveillance Assistants with as little
as ten weeks of training.
In its national development plans, the Government of
Malawi provides for the implementation of an Essential
Table 1: Established posts and vacancies in Malawi's public health system, 2004.
Grade No. of established posts Filled
%
Total (health professionals) 21,337 77
Nurses (all grades) 6,084 36
Clinical officers 3,852 73
Medical assistants 692 47
Surgeons 115 15
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lent per person, yet the Ministry of Health itself estimates
that the number of facilities with adequate staff able to
implement this target is just 9.2 percent of the total
number of facilities. The EHP staffing ratio of 2-2-1 (2
nurses, 2 medical assistants, and 1 clinical officer) per
facility has now been revised downwards for internal
monitoring purposes. This is a tacit admission on the part
of government that Malawi's health human resources cri-
sis is unlikely to be resolved in the near future.
Malawi's own figures for nurses and midwives leaving
Malawi and seeking validation of certificates is running at
just over 100 per year. In 2002, of the 103 who left, 83
went to the UK, with the remainder divided between the
US, New Zealand, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana.
In 2003, 108 nurses and midwives left, with 90 going to
the UK. Recent reports in June 2006 suggest that this
migration pattern is continuing to outstrip Malawi's cur-
rent annual training rate of around 60 nurses per year
[10].
In reality, the number leaving Malawi may be even higher
as some nurses emigrate to pursue careers other than nurs-
ing, in the care industry or otherwise and therefore not
requiring qualification validation certificates, are not
recorded in the statistics above.
The Project Appraisal Document of a USD 15 million
World Bank Health Sector Support Project notes that:
"The exodus of health workers out of [Malawi's] civil service
started in early 2000 and was precipitated largely by the erosion
of salaries, although there are other systemic underlying causes
such as poor working conditions, and lack of drugs and medical
supplies to work with" [11].
Interestingly, the same document notes that in as recently
as 1997/98 the level of vacancies for skilled staff was just
4.8 percent and there were no vacancies at all at the senior
levels. Hence, the "medical brain drain" is a relatively new
phenomenon as far as Malawi is concerned.
In October 2004, the Government of Malawi launched a
major Sector-wide Approach (SWAp) for the health sector
that attempted to revitalise Malawi's health services and
support the delivery of the Essential Health Package. The
SWAp programme of work saw the pooling of funds from
major donors to the sector (UK, Norway and the World
Bank) into the Ministry of Health budget to cover delivery
of the EHP, strengthening of human resources, and sys-
tems strengthening and referral over a seven year period.
The total cost of the SWAp is USD 735.7 million, of which
71 percent is to be provided by external donors [12]. The
Government of Malawi also committed itself to raising
the share of Government spending allocated to health
from 11.2 percent in the 2002/03 budget to 13.5 percent
by the end of the programme in 2009/10.
40 percent of the cost of the SWAp is allocated to strength-
ening human resources, of which a significant proportion
is targeted towards raising the salaries of Malawi's public
health workers. Table 2 shows the pre-October 2004 sala-
ries for selected grades, and the post-October 2004 sala-
ries which include changes in the official salary and a top-
up funded using UK contributions to the SWAp.
Senior physicians have seen the most dramatic increases
in salaries and the gross P4 monthly salary has risen from
USD 243 to USD 1,600. However, salaries at most grades
have risen to the order of 40–60 percent. Mid-level nurse
gross monthly salaries have risen from USD 108 to USD
190.
Table 2: Salary structures for doctors and nurses in Malawi's public health system, 2005.
Grade Currency* Basic gross monthly salary 
(pre Oct-04)
Basic gross monthly salary 
(post Oct-04)
DFID top-up Total gross monthly salary
Senior Physician P4 MWK 29,153 126,000 66,040 192,040
USD 243 1,050 550 1,600
Mid-level Physician P5 MWK 25,216 34,853 20,100 54,953
USD 210 290 168 458
Junior Physician P8 MWK 22,100 23,297 14,246 37,543
USD 184 194 119 313
Senior Nurse PO/CTO MWK 18,320 20,364 12,721 33,085
USD 153 170 106 276
Mid-level Nurse TO MWK 12,930 13,849 8,917 22,766
USD 108 115 74 190
Junior Nurse TA MWK 8,109 5,645 4,391 10,036
USD 68 47 37 84
Source: MoH 2005 [13]
* based on average exchange rate during 2005 of USD 1= MWK 120Page 3 of 8
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medical staff between say, the UK and Malawi is so great,
that these increases are likely to do little to reduce the
incentives for staff to migrate. In the UK a newly qualified
nurse earns £19,166 (USD 33, 290), a new junior physi-
cian £30,433 (USD 52,871), and a new senior physician
£69,991 (USD 121,556) [14]. For newly qualified nurses,
junior doctors and senior physicians this is still equivalent
to around ten or more times the equivalent in Malawi.
Hence it is hardly surprising that the exodus continues.
However, to be fair the primary objective of the SWAp-
funded salary top-up is not to compete with international
labour markets, but to lift Malawi's health workers out of
poverty, to ensure that workers receive at least a "satisfying
level of income", and to discourage workers from leaving
the health profession within Malawi.
Causes of the brain-drain in Malawi and elsewhere
A major cause of the brain-drain in Malawi is the wage dif-
ferential as described above. This is reinforced by a 2001
study of migration from sub-Saharan African countries by
Hatton and Williamson that finds the two most important
factors likely to fuel emigration are the real wage gaps
between sending and receiving countries and, the demo-
graphic booms in the low-wage sending countries [15].
On the basis of their results, the authors find that the sit-
uation in the region is similar to the one in Europe in the
late nineteenth century which fuelled mass migration.
Dovlo highlights a number of "push" and "pull" factors
that contribute to migration among skilled health workers
in Africa [16]. The major "push" factors include low remu-
neration, poor working conditions and low job satisfac-
tion (particularly lack of equipment and medication
which can significantly reduce job satisfaction). "Pull" fac-
tors include aging populations in developed countries
and globalisation related market changes that reduce the
transactions and search costs associated with medical
migration.
Pond looked at the conditions in four developed coun-
tries and found that whilst the above arguments (ageing
populations etc) have an influence, specific policy factors
within these countries have equally caused an increase in
demand for healthcare staff (and policies are amenable to
change in a favourable way): for example, increases in the
level of health spending, and the easing of entry regula-
tions (both immigration and licensing) partly due to the
time-lagged characteristics of the supply of health profes-
sionals (training takes at least six years for doctors, three
years for nurses) [17]. A good example is the recent UK
government's considerable increase in national health
care funding and subsequent demand for staff (in the face
of national shortages), hence the need to look for overseas
sources that led to an easing of restrictions on migration.
Malawi's limited exploitable natural resources, combined
with high population density and high poverty has meant
that the country has a long history of migration. In the
early post-independence years of the 1960s and 1970s,
the major destination for official migration were the
mines of South Africa. In 1972, for instance, remittances
accounted for some 7 percent of GDP and 35 percent of
total exports. However by the early 1990s, and for a
number of reasons, the number of Malawians working in
South Africa's mines had dwindled to almost none [18].
While the work in South Africa's mines was far from risk-
free, these jobs were valued in Malawi due to the relatively
high pay and official nature of the positions. Since the
demise of such opportunities, Malawians have looked for
other means to migrate. In 2000, it was estimated that
some 17.4 percent of Malawi's skilled workforce was
working abroad [19].
The demand for skilled health professionals by rich coun-
tries is likely to increase as their population's age and
require more health (and social) care. Attempts to stem
this "brain drain" have not been successful – the UK has
initiated a policy of banning the active recruitment of
healthcare staff from the poorest countries (the only
country to do so), however this may not be working effec-
tively as it faces practical challenges and infringes individ-
uals' human rights. Indeed, there are more foreign-trained
nurses on the UK nurse register than new British trained
recruits [6,7].
An alternative view: migration and remittances
The "brain drain" crisis can also be seen as a process that
Malawi can theoretically capitalise on. Virtually all of
Malawi's major export sectors are struggling to compete
on world markets, yet without any policy effort whatso-
ever Malawi has demonstrated its competitiveness in the
training (or "production") of doctors and nurses. Such
exports allow Malawi to bypass the formal trade facilita-
tion challenges (from the World Trade Organisation) that
so hamper exports. The remittances from migrants are
particularly important aspect of this alternative view.
Unfortunately, data on remittances into Malawi is very
limited and so it is not possible to measure the scale or
impact of remittances from overseas workers, let alone the
specific impact of remittances earned by skilled medical
personnel working abroad. Therefore we present here
international evidence as well.
Remittances: the international evidence
Recent research has shown that international remittances
are becoming one of the fastest growing and principle
sources of foreign exchange for many least developed
countries. Global remittances to developing countries
reached USD 160 billion in 2004, considerably larger
than ODA flows (USD 79 billion) and almost equal toPage 4 of 8
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(USD 166 billion) [20]. In fact, remittances are almost
certainly underreported by perhaps up to 50 percent,
implying that the returns to international migration are
the dominant form of financial flows into developing
countries.
In some countries remittances are a major source of serv-
ices exports and foreign exchange. Mexico's annual remit-
tance inflow has risen rapidly over recent years and now
reaching USD 20 billion annually, is second only to petro-
leum as a generator of national wealth. Remittances also
bring in more foreign exchange than tea exports in Sri
Lanka, more than tourism in Morocco, and in Jordan,
Lesotho, Nicaragua, Tonga and Tajikistan, they provide
more than a quarter of gross national product [21].
Remittances also have a strong impact on poverty as they
tend to go direct to poor households in developing coun-
tries, unlike official development assistance which is
channelled through various development agencies and
national governments and therefore has a much reduced
pro-poor impact at the household level. World Bank anal-
ysis on Uganda, Bangladesh and Ghana has shown that
the flow of international remittances have reduced pov-
erty by 11, 6 and 5 percent respectively [20]. Work by
Adams and Page has shown that an increase of 10 per cent
in a country's share of international migrants leads to a 2
percent decline in poverty (measured in US$ per day
terms) [22].
A recent survey of internationally recruited nurses work-
ing in London found that 57 percent of respondents regu-
larly send money home, rising to over 60 percent for
Africans [23]. 20 percent of the nurses were remitting
more than a quarter of their monthly earnings.
Studies from other countries have shown that the remit-
tances can have a number of positive impacts at the micro
level beyond just supporting consumption among the
poor. Work by Hanson and Woodruff shows that in Mex-
ico, households with a migrant member complete signifi-
cantly more years of schooling [24]. In Sri Lanka, De and
Ratha find that remittance income has a significant posi-
tive impact on the weight of children under five years of
age [25].
As with other capital constrained developing countries,
the poor in Malawi are frequently limited in their access
to finance for investment purposes. A study by Mesnard
shows that during the 1980s, 87 percent of entrepreneur-
ial projects started by Tunisian return migrants were fully
financed by their own savings while abroad [26]. Yang
finds that remittances have a major impact on reducing
the credit constraints to new businesses in the Philippines
[27].
In another paper, and using a household survey data from
Western Kenya, Reardon finds that inflows of remittances
from migrants are positively correlated with increased
demand for education and construction activities in rural
areas [28].
Remittances: the Malawi evidence
Analysing data from the 1998 household living standards
survey of Malawi, Chipeta and Kachaka note that while
migrants' remittances are not the main source of income
for poor Malawian households, they are significant [18].
In 1998, 20.3 percent of poor households received remit-
tances and these remittances accounted for 4.9 percent of
total per capita consumption and 6.3 percent of total per
capita daily income. Migration of Malawians (and there-
fore the potential for remittances) has increased steadily
since the 1998 household living standards survey, and in
fact data from the 2005 round shows that "other current
transfers" account for 9.5 percent of household income,
rising to 14.2 percent of female-headed households [29].
Chipeta and Kachaka also argue that remittances to
Malawi are counter-cyclical and therefore act as a pro-
poor cushion during economic downturns [18].
Lucas studies the impact of remittances on Malawi, Bot-
swana and Lesotho from workers employed in South Afri-
can mines. The author finds that the short run decline in
agricultural productivity due to the loss of labour is more
than offset by later increases in productivity when remit-
tances are utilised in farm investments [29].
Type of migration
A major policy concern from countries that see large scale
emigration, is whether or not migration is temporary or
permanent. Migrants of either kind represent a loss of
labour to the sending country, but if migration is only
temporary then this loss might be seen as an investment
in that when migrants eventually return, they are likely to
bring back improved skills, expertise and knowledge
("brain gain"). Most commentators also tend to agree that
temporary migrants remit a larger share of income than
permanent migrants.
In contrast, permanent migration leads to a permanent
loss of labour and for skills that demonstrate social spill-
overs or effects (i.e. medical personnel), then the cost of
departure invariably exceeds the cost of training. Where
this cost is borne or subsidised by the state, then the effect
is that sending countries (such as Malawi) are effectively
investing in developed country public health.Page 5 of 8
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skilled workers directly reduces their number, a higher
emigration rate might increase the stock of skilled workers
in an economy by increasing the individual incentive to
become trained in a particular skill which is in demand
abroad [30]. The authors continue by noting that by
increasing the expected returns to education, migration
increases the demand for education, and thus potentially
the eventual stock of educated workers.
Essentially this situation represents a "market failure" in
that the benefits of migrating are reserved primarily for
the individual and family members who benefit from
remittances (although there is also an argument that
remitted income consumed or invested is likely to have
significant knock-on effects through the receiving econ-
omy), while the costs of the "brain drain" are borne by the
state (through training costs) and the wider health con-
suming public (that pays for training through the tax sys-
tem).
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Migration has been, and is likely to continue to be a fea-
ture of Malawian society and economy with the medical
"brain-drain" its latest incarnation. There is a case for see-
ing this as a success to be built upon rather than vilified.
Strategies that aim to limit the movement of persons are
likely to be ineffective at best – approaches instead need
to optimise the impact of greater international mobility
through a better understanding of the linkages between
poverty, migration and development [31]. Taking a
longer-term view and one that looks beyond an individ-
ual sector to the benefits to the whole country would sug-
gest that migration and remittances have the potential to
improve health and social outcomes. This means that the
influence of donors (like the UK's DFID) which tends to
focus on a specific sector and have a shorter timescale,
should be secondary to those of the country as a whole.
In order for Malawi to fully capitalise and benefit from the
export of skilled medical personnel the major challenge is
to resolve the incidence of "market failure" whereby the
costs of training medical staff lays with the state, but the
benefits of working abroad are privately accrued. Essen-
tially the uncosted effects of the presence of skilled health
professionals in a country such as Malawi need to be
costed and incorporated in the incentives framework of
health workers that may or may not chose to emigrate.
One solution may be for the state to charge fees for medi-
cal training in Malawi that would be written-off pro rata
over a given number of years of public service during
which the doctor or nurse worked within Malawi. Staff
would then be able to choose to emigrate and pay off the
fees through overseas earnings, or to work off the debt
through public service write-offs within Malawi.
Such a scheme would then allow Malawi to significantly
scale up the training of medical personnel in order to
train/produce for both the domestic health system/mar-
ket and the for abroad/the export market. Goladfarb et al
have explored this option with respect to deliberately
training physicians "for export" in the Philippines [32].
Amin and Freund also make the point that that some sort
of loan scheme might be an effective means of mitigating
the loss of skilled medical personnel [30]. In the context
of the ongoing Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)
negotiations between the countries of Eastern and South-
ern Africa and the EU, the authors recommend that an
EPA, while providing for improved (so-called Mode 4)
access to the EU, should also provide training and techni-
cal assistance to compensate African governments which
carry the cost of training skilled workers, which then emi-
grate to the EU.
Temporary migration schemes have recently been advo-
cated as a way of maximising the potential of migration by
the UN Global Commission on International Migration
[33,34]. A recent joint study by the COMESA Secretariat
and the Commonwealth Secretariat proposes a "managed
temporary migration scheme" for nurses, with a pilot pro-
gramme for four sending countries, including Malawi
[35]. The study includes a number of recommendations to
"ensure" that migrant health professionals return to their
country of origin. Some of the recommendations are
valid, such as recognising experience earned abroad in the
career progression structures in sending countries. How-
ever other recommendations, such as ensuring that work
permits are not renewed after a specified period of time
may violate the human rights of the migrant. In reality,
any scheme which attempts to force migrants to return
home through compulsion, rather than offering fair
incentives, is likely to fail and cause undue stress. In addi-
tion, a managed scheme where migrants are selected
through an official government programme, rather than
based on merit-based recruitment in the market, is likely
to be open to corruption and distortion.
Skeldon makes the entirely correct point that the medical
brain drain is as much internal to an economy, as it is
international [19]. Hence, efforts to restrict, "manage"
migration, or make would-be migrants less attractive as
professionals elsewhere, will not solve the problem of
poor incentives for staff to remain in under-resourced
public health systems, such as in Malawi. Similarly, salary
top-ups such as under the Malawi Health SWAp, while
attractive on one level, are unlikely to ever be of the mag-
nitude needed to stem international departures fromPage 6 of 8
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the incentives for health personnel to move out of their
profession, but remain in Malawi).
Another potential solution that has been presented is to
separate medical professional training in developing
countries into two tracks: an "advanced training pro-
gramme" and a "basic training programme". Staff trained
on the basic programme would be not qualified enough
to be recruited abroad but would help address the some
health needs of the population and are cheaper to train
and employ – indeed Dovlo in a review finds that there
can also be minimal differences in patient outcomes
between clinical officers and doctors [36]. The Clinical
Officer scheme in Malawi is doing this already and its
expansion presents a policy option. Such officers also
work in rural areas too, where doctors are scarcer. The
scale-up of antiretroviral therapy is underway with such
lower cadre health workers in Malawi as part of the 5-year
antiretroviral therapy scale-up Plan (2006–2010) [37,38].
In terms of improving the incentives for migrants to remit,
there is much that the Malawi Government could also do
to facilitate increased remittances by migrants such as per-
mitting the holding of foreign currency denominated
accounts by Malawian's working abroad, without any
requirement to convert foreign currency into Malawi
kwacha. Reducing the cost of sending money from the UK
to Malawi would also improve the incentives to remit,
particularly for smaller, regular amounts. Remittances
have risen significantly as wiring charges for sending
money home have declined over the last ten years [39].
While it may also be tempting, from a social justice aspect
to tax the remittances of migrant health workers, any pol-
icy measure that reduces the incentives to remit is likely to
reduce the positive effects of remitting foreign currency
earnings back to Malawi. A more workable solution might
be for the Malawi Government to enter into an agreement
with the UK Government (or wherever Malawian medical
staff are working) whereby a portion of income tax or
national insurance levied on migrant earnings in the UK
is remitted to the Malawi Government for reinvestment in
public health (highly cost-effective health interventions to
guide policy to meet the health Millennium Development
Goals are available [40]. Such a scheme would not affect
the incentives of the migrant to remit as the income trans-
fer would be purely from developed country government
to developing country government.
In sum there are several policy options that could be used
in the Malawi context as we have described above. The
choice of particular options should be evidence based,
and interdisciplinary in nature when assessing the relative
costs and benefits of health personnel migration, and in
matching where those relative costs and benefits accrue.
Only by ensuring that when a Malawian health worker
chooses to migrate, that decision making process take full
account of the personal and societal costs of emigration,
will the issue of "medical brain drain" be effectively, and
fairly resolved.
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